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Abstract 
Using a new set of survey data on EMS exchange rates, we investigate exchange rate expectations 
and risk premia between December 1985 and August 1991 to assess credibility of the system. It ap- 
pears that the EMS--with the exception of the italian lira--had become credible since early 1990. 
Moreover, one of the core predictions of the target zone literature--the inverse correlation between 
the position of the spot rate in the fluctuation band with its expected change--is corroborated for several 
currencies in the period after April 1990. Although the system appeared to be more credible, the per- 
sistence of interest differentials suggested the existence of risk premia. For four out of six currencies 
we find a significant relationship between the risk premium and the inflation differential relative to 
Germany. 
Many theoretical models have been developed in the past few years to describe 
the functioning of semifixed exchange rate systems like the European Monetary 
System (EMS). Despite these models there is disagreement over how the EMS 
has functioned in practice and, more in particular,  how it has stabilized 1  exchange 
rates. Since it has become well established that market expectations  are the crucial 
factors through which exchange rates are stabilized, we will concentrate on the 
behavior of expectations over time. More specifically,  we will investigate the extent 
to which market expectations within the EMS are compatible with the restrictions 
imposed by the system. For this purpose, we will use previously  unexploited  survey 
data on EMS exchange  rate expectations  between December 1985 and August 
1991 for the Dutch guilder, Belgian franc, French franc,  Italian lira, Spanish peseta, 
and British  poundmrelative  to the German mark. 
The survey data enable us to investigate the influence of the fluctuation  band 
on  expectations  by  replicating  and  extending  the  simplest  test of target  zone 
credibility (Svensson 1991) as well as by testing the basic prediction of the target 
zone literature; that the spot position within the band and the expected change 
in the exchange  rate will be inversely correlated. 348  CAVAGLIA, KOEDIJK AND VLAAR 
Although there is some evidence that the EMS had become more credible from 
1985-1991,  interest differentials  appeared to persist, indicating that the system 
was not fully credible.  2 The persistence of intra-EMS interest differentials probably 
reflected  risk premia.  We  investigate the  relationship  between the ex ante risk 
premia on the one  hand,  and  inflation  differentials  relative  to Germany  and a 
measure of survey uncertainty on the other. 
The plan of this paper is as follows.  In Section 1 we describe actual EMS ex- 
change rates and interest rates as well as the expected exchange rates according 
to the survey data which we use in our study. In Section 2 we address the credi- 
bility issue. EMS risk premia are examined in Section 3 and our conclusions are 
presented in Section 4. 
1.  Data description 
Business International Corporation has been conducting a monthly survey of ex- 
change rate expectations covering a number of currencies relative to the dollar 
and the German mark since late 1985. The results of these surveys are published 
in its Cross Rates Bulletin. For publication purposes, survey participants are asked 
a few days prior to the end of the month to fax three, six, and twelve month expec- 
tations of a number of currencies, with projections being made from the beginning 
of the following  month. 
The approximately 30 participants in the survey are treasurers of multinationals 
and private banks in four of the world's continents. Although not all  participants 
will  provide their views regarding a particular currency, the response rate is, at 
worst, 60%. The Cross Rates Bulletin reports the geometric mean forecast of the 
responses received, thus minimizing the effect of extreme forecasts. Unfortunately, 
disaggregated respondent data is not available,  although the standard deviation 
of the respondents' expectations and the spread between the highest and the lowest 
forecasts is reported. In Table 1 we report the actual change, the expected change 
in the exchange rate, and the interest differential relative to Germany for the Euro- 
pean currencies. 
Several interesting findings stand out in Table 1. Although no formal statistical 
tests have been conducted, differences in the statistics for the expectations data 
and the interest differentials suggest the presence of a contaminating factor, which 
is by definition the risk premium.  Moreover,  both the expected and the realized 
exchange rate changes exhibit nonnormality. Therefore, robust testing procedures 
will  be used throughout the paper, where possible. 
2.  EMS credibility 
Credibility or insufficient credibility has a profound effect on exchange rate expecta- 
tions in Europe and is a key aspect of the functioning of the EMS target zone. Full 
credibility of a semifixed exchange rate regime like the EMS requires convergence EXCHANGE  RATE EXPECTATIONS  349 
Table 1. Actual and expected yearly changes in the German mark rate and in yearly interest rate dif- 
ferentials, December 1985 to August 1991 a 
The ActualChangeinthe Exchange Rate 
DG  BF  FF  IL  SP 1  BP 
Mean  -0.00041  0.00046  0.01254**  0.01652  -0.01943**  0.02078** 
Variance  0.00001  0.00011  0.00048  0.00053  0.00096  0.00692 
Skewness  -0.06701  0.46038  1.74311"*  -0.12623  -0.21687  0.82011** 
Ku~osis  -0.16317  -0.19530  3.12250**  -0.41279  -0.66124  -0.19102 
The Expected Change in the Exchange Rate 
DG  BF  FF  IL  SP  BP 
Mean  -0.00240**  0.00605**  0.01159**  0.01635**  0.02238**  0.01705** 
Variance  0.00006  0.00022  0.00021  0.00071  0.00041  0.00065 
Skewness  -0.54539*  0.61799**  0.12769  -0.96965**  0.19496  -0.06554 
Ku~osis  0.33844  0.45612  -0.15052  3.02775**  -0.50783  -0.57811 
ThelnterestDifferential 
DG  BF  FF  IL  SP  BP 
Mean  0.00529**  0.02078**  0.02848**  0.05292**  0.06156**  0.05338** 
Variance  0.00002  0.00015  0.00032  0.00051  0.00036  0.00017 
Skewness  0.46396  0.59915**  1.15419"*  0.76388**  0.15977  -1.25359"* 
Kurtosis  -0.99238  1.21402"  2.58702**  1.38838"*  -0.16281**  1.48900"* 
aApart from the expectations, all data are taken from DATASTREAM.  Spot exchange rate quotations 
originate from Barclays Bank. Interest differentials are computed from Eurodeposit rates with a twelve- 
month maturity as reported in the Financial Times. Survey responses for the Spanish peseta began 
in November 1986. 
*(**)Indicates significance at the 10% (5%) level (assuming normality). 
of the economic fundamentals  of the participating  countries.  As stressed in  De 
Grauwe (1992), credibility is closely linked to the analysis of the costs and benefits 
of relinquishing the exchange rate as a policy instrument. If a country suffers from 
an external shock, the exchange rate might be the least-cost instrument to adjust 
the economy. If the government concerned has not yet built up a great reputation 
for keeping fixed parities, economic agents will anticipate a devaluation and ad- 
just their inflation expectations, thereby further worsening the effects of the shock 
on the economy. In recent years the European Monetary System has witnessed 
a noticeable convergence of the economic fundamentals,  as a result of which it 
is widely held in the literature that the EMS had gained credibility (e.g., Frankel 
and Phillips 1991; Ungerer,  Hauvonen, Lopez-Claros and Mayer 1990; and Weber 
1991). 
In this section we assess the credibility of the EMS by means of Svensson's 
(1991) simple test of target zone credibility. Using the 12-month  3 eurointerest dif- 
ferential of the various EMS currencies relative to the German mark, we compute 
the implied expected exchange rate one year ahead and investigate  whether this 350  CAVAGLIA, KOEDIJK AND VLAAR 
exchange rate forecast lies within the EMS fluctuation  band. If the EMS band is 
perceived by the market to be fully credible, the current actual exchange rate and 
the future expected exchange rates should both be within the EMS target zone 
boundaries. This is true even if there are risk premia, since the maximum  risk in 
the absence of devaluations is bounded by the upper fluctuation margin, so there 
is no reason not to exploit  interest rate differentials  that exceed the maximum 
depreciation within the band. 
In addition to using interest differentials, we use the actual exchange rate predic- 
tion for one year ahead, taken from the new survey data. These exchange rate 
predictions provide a direct and concise test for assessing EMS credibility. 
In Figures 1-6 we have plotted the actual EMS exchange rates relative to the 
German  mark, the fluctuation  bands, the exchange rate forecast implied  by the 
interest differentials, and the actual exchange rate prediction from the survey data 
set.4 
In Figure 1 the Belgian franc is plotted relative to the German  mark.  Several 
points are noteworthy. First, it took until April 1990 for the Belgian franc to become 
credible within the EMS.  In that month the German government agreed on the 
terms of monetary conversion and union with Eastern Germany, to be enacted July 
2, 1990. An important ingredient of this monetary union was the conversion rate 
at which the old East German  mark was converted  into German  mark.  Prior to 
the unification, one East German mark traded at a rate of six East marks for one 
West mark in the black market. Nevertheless, the German authorities decided to 
use  a  1:1  conversion  rate  for  East  German  wages.  5 Apparently  this  rate  and 
especially its consequences, such as a drastic deterioration  in East German in- 
dustries after the unification, were viewed as highly problematic in the EMS foreign 
exchange rate market. Market participants therefore expected a strengthening of 
the Belgian franc relative to the German mark.  In June and July of 1990 the ex- 
change rate forecasts based both on the interest differentials and on the new survey 
data move further toward the center of the official fluctuation band of the Belgian 
franc.  In addition to the effects of the German unification, this increase in credi- 
bility appears to be at least partly the result of the declaration of the Belgian cen- 
tral bank in June 1990 that maintaining the Belgian franc-German mark exchange 
rate would be its main  policy target. 
In Figure 2 the French franc is shown relative to the German mark. Although 
the last realignment of this currency was in early 1987, interest differentials and 
survey forecasts indicate that it took until April 1990 for the French franc to become 
credible. This increase in  credibility  probably reflects the French declaration  in 
March  1990 never to devalue again. 
In Figure 3 the Italian experience is presented. As is apparent, the Italian lira's 
position in the EMS was not perceived to be credible at any time during the sam- 
ple period.  Both the expected exchange rate based on survey data and the ex- 
pected exchange rate based on the interest differential  lie outside the fluctuation 
bands. From this point of view it is not surprising that the lira had to devalue in 
September 1992. The surprising thing is that this devaluation did not occur any 
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Figure  1. Spot exchange rate and 1-year-ahead forecasts: BF/DM. 
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Figure 3.  Spot  exchange  rate  and  1-year-ahead  forecasts:  IUDM. 
In Figure 4 we have plotted the Dutch experience. As is evident from the graph, 
the Dutch guilder has been credible during the whole sample period, according to 
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Figure4.  Spot exchange rate and 1-year-ahead forecasts: DG/DM. 
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Figure 5. Spot exchange rate and 1-year-ahead forecasts: SP/DM. 
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Figure 6. Spot exchange rate and 1-year-ahead forecasts: BP/DM. 
In Figure 5 the Spanish experience  is presented. This experience  is relatively 
fresh since Spain only joined the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS on June 
19,  1989.  Despite  this  relatively  short  period,  several  interesting  phenomena 
become clear from the graph.  First, joining the EMS had an immediate effect on EXCHANGE RATE EXPECTATIONS  353 
expectations: the variation in the predictions based on the interest differentials as 
well as the predictions based on the survey data decreased significantly after June 
1989. Second, according to the interest differentials and survey data, the peseta's 
band was credible from the start. The peseta probably benefited from the reputa- 
tion of the EMS that devaluations were no longer common practice. Third, more 
or less immediately after joining the exchange rate mechanism, the Spanish peseta 
moved to the lower part of the 6% fluctuation band, reflecting the strength of this 
currency. 6 
Finally,  in Figure 6, we present the results for the U.K. pound. The pound joined 
the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS on October 8, 1990. As with the Spanish 
peseta, this had a noticeable effect on exchange rate expectations and interest 
rates. Moreover,  it appears that the British pound had been credible since then 
according to the various  measures. 
In summary, we find that the Dutch guilder has been fully credible over the sample 
period  December  1985 to August 1991.  For the  Belgian  and  French franc fuml 
credibility in the EMS setting dates only from April 1990, after which expectations 
for these currencies are consistently within the fluctuation  band. The Italian  lira 
appeared not to be credible at any time during the sample period: both the forecasts 
based on interest differentials and the forecasts of the survey data appeared to be 
frequently above or below the fluctuation band. The two newcomers in our sample, 
the Spanish peseta and the British pound, appeared to be credible from the start. 
One reason why these newcomers were perceived to be credible might  be the 
known political  resistance to  realignments.  Both the  number,  and the average 
magnitude of the realignments have decreased over the years. Although the main 
reason for this reduction has been the economic convergence of the economies, 
it was also quite clear that this convergence was far from complete, especially for 
the Italian  lira.  With the Danish rejection of the Maastricht treaty in June  1992, 
the optimism on the functioning of the EMS started eroding. Tensions continued 
to build and reached a climax before the French referendum in September 1992. 
Italy and the U.K. experienced severe speculative attacks on their currencies, which 
led to the suspension of their membership from the system. These events clearly 
showed that a devaluation can be forced upon politicians,  if the market believes 
this to be necessary. The intriguing lesson from these recent developments is that 
credibility, built over many years, can easily vanish if the underlying fundamentals 
in the participating countries are not converging and/or if the authorities are not 
clear on the priority given to exchange rate stability. 
In addition to the simplest target zone credibility tests, we also test whether EMS 
exchange rate behavior conformed with the basic predictions of the standard target 
zone  models as developed by Krugman (1991) and extended by others (e.g., Ber- 
tola and Caballero 1992; Lindberg and S~derlind 1991; and Bertola and Svensson 
1993). The target zone literature starts from the observation that, due to the forward- 
looking nature of rational agents, the presence of an exchange rate band exerts an 
influence on the current movements of exchange rates. By adopting a continuous- 
time framework, assuming normal innovations and a band from which the exchange 
rate cannot escape, Krugman (1991) showed that exchange rates within semifixed 354  CAVAGLIA,  KOEDIJK AND VLAAR 
exchange  rate systems follow regulated Brownian motion. This produces the elegant 
and intuitively appealing S-shape behavior of exchange rates within target zones; 
the presence of the band and possible  intervention  by the monetary authorities 
drives the exchange rate away from the edges toward the center of the fluctuation 
band. Hence, in a fully credible target zone,  one would expect to find a negative 
correlation  between the spot position of the exchange  rate in the band and the 
expected change  in the exchange  rate.  v 
While the target zone literature provides  an  intuitive account of the influence 
of the band, the empirical validity of these models has not been undisputed. Meese 
and Rose (1990) test parametrically and nonparametrically for the presence of the 
nonlinear terms introduced by the regulated Brownian motion, but fail to turn up 
evidence in favor of these terms. Attempts by other researchers to detect the S- 
shape  have  not been successful  either. 
We use survey data to directly test for the negative correlation.  In Table 2 we 
present the correlation  between the spot position  and the expected change for 
the periods December 1985 to August 1991 and April  1990 to August 1991. We 
used interest differentials  as well as the survey data to make forecasts of the ex- 
change  rate changes. 
As the table shows, we failed to find  evidence for a negative  relationship  be- 
tween the spot position and the expected charige in the exchange rate for the period 
December  1985 to August  1991.  For the subperiod April  1990 to August  1991, 
however, we do find significant evidence of a negative correlation.  Using the survey 
expectations, we find a negative correlation for all currencies except the Spanish 
peseta. The results for the interest rate data are less convincing.  Here we find a 
significant negative  correlation for the Dutch guilder and the French franc, whereas 
the negative sign for the Italian lira is not quite significant  at the 10% level. However, 
all the correlations over the latter period are smaller than over the whole sample 
period, indicating  an increasing  credibility.  In summary, we find evidence suggesting 
that exchange  rate behavior within the EMS has conformed  more closely to the 
predictions of target zone models since April 1990 and that exchange rate expec- 
tations within the EMS are influenced  by the band. 
Table 2.  Correlation coefficients:  position in band and expected change in the exchange rate. 
December 1985-August  1991  April  1990-August  1991 
Survey  Interest Differential  Survey  Interest Differential 
DG  -0.04  0.08  -0.64* *  -0.79" * 
BF  0.34* *  0.55* *  -0.27  -0.33 
FF  0.00  -0.27* *  -0.52* *  -0.82* * 
I  L  0.14  0.19  -0.24"  -0.37 
SP  a  0.08  0.44* *  0.09  0.11 
UK  a  -0.46  0.36 
aCorrelations for the Spanish peseta and the British pound are computed with data from June 1989 
and October  1990 onwards,  respectively. 
*(**)  Indicates significance at the 10% (5%)  level (assuming  normality). EXCHANGE  RATE EXPECTATIONS  355 
The results reported in Table 2 are somewhat stronger than the ones obtained 
by Frankel and Phillips (1991). They computed the same correlations, using survey 
data on the U.S. dollar over the period February 1988 to July 1991.  They found 
only meager evidence of a negative correlation. The differences might be caused 
by the use of cross-rates in their study and/or by differences in the sample period. 
Recently, a number of studies have used a more sophisticated  credibility measure 
based on work by Bertola and Svensson (1993) in the so-called second genera- 
tion target zone models. In this framework, the expected rate of devaluation  (realign- 
ment probability times the expected size) is computed as the difference between 
the total expected depreciation  and the expected depreciation  within the band. 
To assess the total expected depreciation survey data (Frankel and Phillips 1991) 
or interest differentials (Rose and Svensson 1991; Svensson 1993; and Chen and 
Giovannini 1992) are used. The expected depreciation within the band is computed 
using a time series model, excluding the data around realignment dates. 
We do not follow this procedure, however, since one of the crucial assumptions 
of the empirical  model  is that the expected change of the exchange  rate within 
the band depends solely on its current position.  This conflicts with the Bertola- 
Caballero (1992) model, which shows that the expected exchange  rate change 
within the band crucially depends also on the time-varying realignment probabil- 
ity. 8 In our view thes interconnected  issues cannot be separated empirically. 
Although the figures and results in Table 2 seem to suggest that the EMS had 
gained credibility between 1985 and 1991, considerable EMS interest differentials 
persisted. In a fully credible fixed exchange rate regime one would expect interest 
differentials to disappear over time. To deal with this issue, we compare interest 
differentials with exchange rate expectations, the difference of which is by defini- 
tion equal to the risk premium. 
3. EMS risk premia 
The starting point in our analysis of EMS risk premia is the definition of covered 
interest parity, which equates the interest differential  to the forward discount. Defin- 
ing St as the natural log of the spot exchange rate (domestic currency per unit of 
foreign  currency) at time t, and F~  ÷k as natural  log of forward rate at time t for 
delivery at time t  +  k, i(t,  t  +  k) as the interest rate on a eurodeposit in domestic 
currency at time t and maturing at time t  +  k, and i*(t,  t  +  k) as the equivalent 
interest rate on the foreign currency, then the covered interest parity relation may 
be stated as: 
Ftt +k  -  St  =  i(t,  t  +  k)  -  i*(t,  t  +  k)  (1) 
Assuming market efficiency and rational expectations, the forward exchange rate 
is equal to the expected future spot rate plus a risk premium, rp~  ÷k (see Hodrick 
and Srivastava  1984).  Equation  (1), may therefore be restated as follows: 
Et(St+k)  +  rp~ +k  -  St  =  i(t,  t  +  k)  -  i*(t,  t  +  k)  (2) 356  CAVAGLIA, KOEDIJK  AND VLAAR 
As is evident from (2), the risk premium is by definition equal to the difference be- 
tween the interest differential and the expected change in the exchange rate. As 
to the nature of this risk premium in the foreign exchange makret, it has recently 
been  argued  by Dornbusch  (1991) that  it is  primarily  a  "peso-type  premium" 
(Krasker 1980). The argument goes as follows.  When some weak EMS members 
in the past decided to start following the macroeconomic policies required to con- 
verge to Germany, the anchor country,  it took some time to convince  financial 
markets of the countries' true commitment to the announced policy. As a conse- 
quence, stable exchange ratesmas an indicator of actual policy--were still accom- 
panied by relatively high interest differentials,  reflecting the possibility of a policy 
turnaround  and  an  associated  devaluation  of  the  weak  EMS  currency. 
Simultaneously,  monetary  authorities  were constrained  by their  own  policies, 
because devaluations to account for the current inflation  differentials would jeo- 
pardize the adjustment itself. On the one hand, a devaluation would lead to addi- 
tional imported inflation and on the other hand it would reduce the market's belief 
in the policies that had been announced.  In short, this created a type of "peso 
problem" reflected  in persistently  high interest differentials. 9 In order to investigate 
the  relevance  of this  argument,  we examine the  relationship  between the  risk 
premium and economic fundamentals. 
Empirical evidence on risk premia in foreign exchange markets,  documenting 
economic  explanations,  is  extremely  scarce, i° Giovannini  (1990),  for  instance, 
finds that his measures of the risk premium can explain little, if any, of the interest 
differential.  One major drawback of most previous studies on the risk premium 
was that these relied on ex post measures of the premium. The available survey 
data now allow us to construct ex ante measures.  In our estimates we relate the 
ex ante risk premium to two classes of variables:  economic fundamentals  and 
measures of survey uncertainty.  As we expect this risk premium to be related to 
devaluation  risk, we might expect a structural  change in the premium after the EMS 
had gained credibility in April 1990.  However, using a dummy variable,  no signifi- 
cant change since April 1990 was found for any of the currencies.  Moreover, the 
membership in the ERM did not seem to have a significant effect,  either for the 
British  pound and the Spanish  peseta. 
In Table 3 we present the results of fitting  a regression of the risk premia on 
its lagged values and the lagged inflation differential. The inclusion of lagged premia 
follows Wolff (1987), who finds evidence that premia denominated in U.S. dollars 
are correlated. The past year inflation  differential  is lagged by two months since 
consumer price statistics  are released with a six to eight week delay. 
The Ftest statistic indicates the existence of fourth order autocorrelation for the 
Spanish peseta and the British pound. This does not make the results inconsis- 
tent, however, although robust standard errors must be used. Therefore, the t-values 
were computed  using the Newey-West (1987) procedure. 
Contrary to previous studies on the EMS risk premium, we find significant results 
for the effect of the inflation differential on the risk premium for the Belgian franc, 
the French franc,  and the Spanish peseta. 1~ We fail to find evidence for the Italian 
lira.  Another interesting feature,  reported in Table 3, is the significantly  positive EXCHANGE  RATE  EXPECTATIONS  357 
Table 3.  EMS risk premia and inflation differentials. 
rPt  =  c~0  +  ~lrPt-1  +  ~2rPt-2  +  ~3(P  -  pG)t-2 
DG  BF  FF  IL  SP  BP 
~o  0.006  0.009  0.005  0.011  0.003  0.012 
(3.18)  (5.09)  (2.54)  (1.19)  (0.36)  (0.97) 
~1  0.039  --  0.316  0,162  --  0.345 
(0.37)  (3.97)  (1.24)  (3.62) 
~2  0.286  --  --  0.317  --  -- 
(3.09)  (5.11 ) 
o~  3  0.169  0.857  0.364  0.197  0.873  0.259 
(1.52)  (3.78)  (9.93)  (0.98)  (4.98)  (1.08) 
R 2  0.27  0.18  0.32  0.17  0.31  0.15 
D.W.  1.93  2.08  1.79  2.01  1.89  2.06 
F  0.48  0.56  1.80  0.84  3.02  3.04 
[0.75]  [0.70]  [0.14]  [0.50]  [0.03]  [0.02] 
The sample consists of 67 monthly observations from February 1986 to August 1991, except for the 
Spanish peseta, for which the starting date is November 1986. 
P-values and  heteroskedasticity and fourth  order autocorrelation consistent t-values are between 
brackets and parentheses, respectively. 
The F test statistic is a heteroskedasticity-consistent  test for fourth order autocorrelation (see Wooldridge 
1990). 
intercept for several currencies. This probably reflects the German anti-inflation 
reputation. Even in the absence of actual inflation differentials, the German mark 
is preferred to the other currencies. In addition to the inflation differential, the trade 
deficit  was added  as an  explanatory  variable  but was found  to be statistically 
insignificant.12 
In Table 4, the effect of heterogeneous expectations in the survey are also taken 
into account.  In Frankel and Froot (1990) it is shown that dispersion in expecta- 
tions,  measured by the percentage standard deviation,  Granger-causes market 
volume and volatility.  If survey dispersion and market volatility are really positively 
related,  one should expect this dispersion to influence the risk premia as well. Since 
the survey standard deviation was no longer reported from mid-1990 on, we used 
the spread between the highest and lowest value as a measure of survey uncer- 
tainty. The results are somewhat mixed.  Although all the coefficients on survey 
uncertainty have the expected positive sign, only two out of six are significantly 
different from zero (at the 5% level). 13 The results for the inflation differentials in 
the equation for the risk premia improve significantly for the British pound, so that 
a highly significant inflation effect on the risk premium is now found for four out 
of six currencies. 358  CAVAGLIA,  KOEDIJK AND VLAAR 
Table 4. EMS risk premia: inflation differentials and survey uncertainty. 
I13 t  =  tX  0  +  otlrPt_ 1  +  tx2rPt_ 2  +  ot3(t)  --  16C0t_2  +  ot4(uncert)t 
DG  BF  FF  IL  SP  BP 
s o  0.004  0.005  0.005  0.008  0.000  -0.013 
(1.82)  (2.34)  (1.71)  (1.02)  (0.01)  (-1.29) 
otI  0.048  --  0.318  0.157  --  0.244 
(0.48)  (4.05)  (1.21)  (1.91) 
o~  2  0,270  --  --  0.315  --  -- 
(2.72)  (5.69) 
~3  0.140  0.751  0.361  0.178  0.888  0.426 
(1.21)  (3.24)  (11.41)  (0.91)  (5.54)  (3.06) 
ot  4  0.029  0.047  0.007  0.032  0.027  0.135 
(1.46)  (2.37)  (0.58)  (1.23)  (0,36)  (2.15) 
R 2  0.31  0.24  0.32  0.1 IJ  0,32  0.24 
D.W.  1.93  2.13  1.79  2.01  1.91  2.08 
F  1.96  0.35  1.62  0.96  2.85  3.07 
[0.11 ]  [0.84]  [0.18]  [0.44]  [0.03]  [0.02] 
For notes, see Table 3. 
4. Conclusion 
We have used new survey data on EMS exchange rates between December 1985 
and August 1991 to investigate EMS credibility  and risk premia for the Dutch guilder, 
the Belgian franc,  the French franc,  the Italian  lira, the Spanish peseta,  and the 
U.K. pound. We find that, except for the Italian  lira, the hypothesis of the simplest 
test of target zone credibility cannot be rejected for the period since early 1990. 
The results for the Belgian and French franc are especially interesting.  For both 
currencies it appears that, despite the fact that the last realignment was in early 
1987, it took until April 1990 for their position in the EMS to become credible. The 
observed increase in credibility in this month is probably partly due to the expected 
weakening of the German mark as a result of the announcement  on the terms 
of monetary conversion  and union with East  Germany. 
As an additional test of EMS credibility, we investigated whether exchange rate 
behavior within the  EMS is in  line with the basic  prediction  of the target zone 
literature: that the expected depreciation of a currency will be inversely correlated 
to its position in the band. We find this to hold for the Dutch guilder,  the French 
franc,  and the Italian  lira since early 1990. 
Although the system had become more credible over the sample period, interest 
differentials within the EMS persisted. This probably reflected the presence of risk 
premia. We explicitly investigated  EMS risk premia and found, for four out of six 
currencies, statistically significant relationships between the ex ante risk premium 
and the inflation  differential  relative  to Germany. EXCHANGE  RATE EXPECTATIONS  359 
Despite growing credibility  over our sample  period, the recent developments 
following the Danish and French referenda on the Maastricht treaty have shown 
that risk of devaluations remains as long as underlying economic fundamentals 
are not fully converged and/or if the authorities are not clear on the priority given 
to exchange  rate stability.  The fact that currency  markets give  clear signals of 
increased credibility while at the same time collapse is very near,  is in our view 
a major puzzle in international macroeconomics. It seems that without permanent 
political and institutional  arrangement, a fixed exchange rate regime is doomed 
to failure. 
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Notes 
1. See, for instance,  Chen and Giovannini (1992). 
2. Obstfeld (1991) shows that the mere existence of the realignment possibility already destabilizes 
the exchange rate system, even if the authorities pledge they will only use this escape clause in 
extreme circumstances.  This is primarily because contingencies under which they will devalue 
are often not observable, or may change over time. 
3. As  stressed  by  Svensson  (1991,  1993), tests  of credibility should  preferably use  long-term 
expectations. 
4. The expectations,  shown at, say, January 1990, represent predictions  for January 1991. 
5. For savings above a certain limit, a conversion  rate of 2:1 was used. 
6. The strength of the peseta is probably due to the very high Spanish interest rates. According to 
economic indicators such as inflation or trade deficits, the peseta should be a weak currency. 
7. For a recent, extensive overview of the target zone literature, see Svensson (1992). 
8. For a recent assessment of the assumptions underlying the target zone model, see Krugman and 
Miller (1992). 
9. This argument suggests that the system is not fully credible. 
10. See, for instance, Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) and Giovannini (1990). 
11. The finding of a significant inflation effect is in accordance with the findings of Rose and Svensson 
(1993), who found the inflation differential to be the only fundamental determining the market ex- 
pectation of a realignment. 
12. The specification with inflation differentials and trade deficits was motivated from Vlaar (1992), 
where it was shown that these variables do significantly influence exchange rate changes within 
the EMS. 
13. The limited significance of the survey spread could be due to changes in the response rate, which 
introduces  differences in the survey uncertainty measure, unrelated to market uncertainty. 360  CAVAGLIA, KOEDIJK AND VLAAR 
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